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Most economic models for time allocation ignore constraints on what people can actually do with
their time.  Economists recently have emphasized the importance of considering prior consumption
commitments that constrain behavior.  This research develops a new model for time valuation that
uses time commitments to distinguish consumers' choice margins and the different values of time these
imply.  The model is estimated using a new survey that elicits revealed and stated preference data
on household time allocation.  The empirical results support the framework and find an increasing
marginal opportunity cost of time as longer time blocks are used.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
  Most economic models for time allocation ignore institutional constraints on what people 
can actually do with their time.  For example, in the choice of a mix of work and leisure, 
conventional practice holds that workers are free to set their hours, or equivalently there is a 
continuous array of total earnings and hours combinations so that choices appear as though 
marginal evaluations were undertaken.  However, for most occupations these assumptions are 
not realistic.
1  For most households some time allocations and the choices of some consumption 
goods are quasi-fixed commitments that are costly to adjust over short time periods.  Chetty and 
Szeidl (2007) use this idea to explain how household responses to income shocks will depend on 
the extent to which their consumption expenditures are difficult to adjust.  Using the consumer 
expenditure survey in adjoining years they find consumption commitments comprise about 50 
percent of the average household’s annual expenditures. For workers in conventional full time 
jobs the amount of time available for household activities, including leisure, may be even more 
constrained.  Inevitably work time, commitments for routine household chores, and family 
related activities require significantly more than 50% of non-sleeping hours.  These alternatives 
involve differing transaction costs for adjustment and re-allocations of time are not costless. 
  This paper proposes a new method for evaluating how people tradeoff money for time. 
Our framework begins with the recognition that the opportunity cost of time depends on the 
context in which that time is to be used, following the key insight of DeSerpa’s (1971) early 
model.
2  As a result, time valuation cannot be undertaken independent of what a person wants to 
do with the time.  If the objective is seeing a movie or attending a basketball game, a marginal 
minute has little relevance.  On the other hand, snooze alarms suggest a few minutes may mean a 
lot in the context of time spent resting.  To adequately resolve these issues it might seem a   4
complete description of the dynamic tradeoffs implied by inter-temporal choices is essential.  
Such a framework requires not only a record of the sequencing and duration of activities, but 
perhaps more importantly, an understanding of the constraints to the allocation of time over the 
course of a day, week, or month.  At this time both data and modeling limitations preclude such a 
fully dynamic model.  At the other extreme, one might argue instead that a completely static 
approach in which all time allocations are simultaneously modeled for a set of individuals might 
be preferable.  Unfortunately, the cascading set of maintained hypotheses would be hidden from 
view because they would be part of the data construction.  
  In contrast to these two extremes, our approach decomposes a dynamic sequence of 
temporally ordered choices into decision steps.  Each step generates a shadow value for relaxing 
the relevant constraint in that step.  The shadow values at one step are only one factor 
influencing decisions in subsequent steps.  Thus, time allocation is the result of a mixed set of 
sequenced and simultaneous choices.  Our formulation of the problem parallels the Chetty and 
Szeidl (2007) description of how prior commitments affect an individual’s perceived 
responsiveness to shocks.  In their analysis, decisions on quasi-fixed goods are made in an initial 
period, recognizing that uncertain shocks may impose greater costs after commitments have been 
made.  Their model treats these period zero decisions as exogenous and considers how the 
subsequent costs of adjustment affect behavior.  In our analysis, we hypothesize that there are 
two types of time commitments:  those that are exceptionally costly to alter and those that are 
more readily modified.  The former might correspond to the time commitments to work or other 
aspects of one’s lifestyle (e.g. commuting time, commitments to civic or religious groups, etc.) 
and are comparable to the Chetty-Szeidl consumption commitments.  The latter type corresponds 
to necessary but more flexible chores that can be re-allocated from one time interval to another.    5
The cost of obtaining larger blocks of time therefore results from the incremental costs of 
shifting home production between time intervals.   
  Our approach cannot be implemented with conventional data or even a diary such as 
would be available from some surveys.  We address the issues associated with relaxing the time 
constraints people face by offering our survey respondents opportunities to alter them.  That is, 
we ask two hypothetical questions.  One asks about a respondent’s desire to adjust his or her 
work time and a second offers a new service that allows the constraints each person faces in time 
allocation to be relaxed.  Our analysis combines three sets of information. The first involves 
choices consistent with a conventional censored labor supply model, as in Heckman (1974).  The 
second component involves a set of reported time uses.  Finally our new stated choice question 
offers the ability to relax constraints that are imposed by personal circumstances.   
  Many uses of time require contiguous blocks, so the way the available time is divided 
affects how it can be used.  For example, one four-hour period of time conveys different 
consumption possibilities than four one-hour periods.  Finding a large enough block of time will 
require (potentially costly) shifting of competing activities to other periods.  Some of these 
activities may be necessary but not especially enjoyable, such as cleaning the house or tending 
the yard.  Shifting these activities between time periods will involve a household production 
function for household maintenance.  If there is diminishing marginal productivity of time in 
these alternative activities in a given block of time, completing household tasks in one period in 
order to free another period for leisure implies that, as a greater amount of time is shifted, there is 
an increasing marginal opportunity cost of the time being made available.
3 
We test the hypothesis that different sized blocks of leisure time have different marginal 
opportunity costs for the same person.  The different choice margins for time allocation are used   6
in a two-step estimation strategy that measures the shadow values of different sized blocks of 
leisure time.  Our results confirm that this strategy appears to have genuine potential for 
evaluating how people make non-work time allocation choices.  Section two describes the 
context for our proposal in terms of past efforts to use labor/leisure choices to uncover measures 
of the opportunity cost of time.  In section three we outline the model and section four describes 
our empirical implementation of the model.  After describing the data used for estimating the 
model in section five, we discuss our estimates in section six and conclude by offering some 
general observations about the potential application of the framework in addressing the role of 
non-market activities in the national accounts.  
II.  WHAT IS KNOWN? 
  Most of the new literature on labor supply estimates considers workers who have flexible 
hours (e.g. Camerer et al., 1997; Farber, 2005).  As we noted, these studies test the restrictions 
implied by conventional models of labor supply.  They do not consider other time allocations.  
Recent attention to time use surveys expands the scope of activities considered but offers only 
indirect information on the opportunity cost of alternative non-work time allocations.  For 
example, Hamermesh (2005) finds that income does influence whether individuals seek to avoid 
“routine” time uses day to day.  In another application, exploiting time use surveys, Connolly 
(2005) investigates whether rainy conditions affect time allocated to work, home production, and 
leisure activities.  She finds greatest effects for males in Sunbelt areas substituting out of leisure 
and home production and into work during rainy days.  Both studies confirm inter-temporal 
substitution is made but do not offer insights on how it might compare with the tradeoffs 
revealed in labor market choices.   7
The closest intellectual antecedents for our model can be found in the early papers by 
Johnson (1966) and DeSerpa (1971).  Johnson’s analysis demonstrated that when work and 
leisure enter preferences separately, the value of any use of time will be less than the wage rate. 
DeSerpa’s analysis extends this framework distinguishing time uses where the amount of time 
required for an activity is a constraint versus where it is discretionary.  In the latter case, he 
argues “time prices” have no effect on choice.  We extend this analysis to demonstrate that when 
there is discretion in the amounts and scheduling of the time used as well as the requirement that 
some time is essential to accomplishing required activities, there is the potential for different 
marginal values of time. 
  In another strand of the literature, Heckman’s labor supply model explains why workers 
without flexibility in their hours worked reveal little about their value of time, even if work does 
not affect utility.  Individuals without flexibility are at the kink in their budget constraint, so the 
analyst does not know what they would do if they were able to adjust.  By contrast, individuals 
with second jobs reveal an excess demand for work and thus a reservation value for leisure less 
than the wage on their primary job.  It might seem that the only opportunity to measure the value 
of time with traditional full time workers is through their job change decisions, and even here 
discontinuities would cause problems.  An alternative strategy was implemented by Feather and 
Shaw (2000) by adapting Heckman’s (1974) labor supply model to recover information about 
shadow values of time for individuals unable to adjust their work time.  They asked respondents 
how they would adjust their hours worked, if given the opportunity.  Their answers determined 
whether a non-flexible individual’s existing wage was an upper or lower bound on their 
reservation wage.     8
While this early research highlights the different margins at which time allocations are 
made, recognition of the effects of these choice margins has not been incorporated into the 
measurement of the implied values for time.  Labor/leisure commitments associated with most 
labor supply models are longer-term, quasi-fixed employment choices.  These choices affect, but 
are different from, the short term allocation of discretionary time.   
III.  CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
  Our model of individual behavior assumes decisions take place over different time 
horizons.  Employment and residential location are decisions made as part of long run choices.  
There is another set of activities where decisions are also made over a longer time horizon.  We 
refer to these activities as ‘household maintenance’.  Household maintenance includes home 
production tasks such as preparing food, caring for children, cleaning the house, and caring for 
the yard.  The amount of time spent on household maintenance can vary over short time periods, 
but over a longer time horizon the total level of maintenance is determined by the personalities 
and habits of the members of the household.  For short-run decisions (Chetty and Szeidl’s period 
one), households take employment, residential location, and total maintenance level as 
predetermined.   
We assume that choices in period one are decomposed into J weeks.  Each week offers 
the same discretionary time (which can be allocated to leisure activities and maintenance) as any 
other week, based on the period zero decisions. T
 j represents the total amount of non-work (and 
non-sleep) time that is available in week j.  This time is used for household maintenance and 
short term leisure activities.  We denote the output of maintenance in week j by M
 j.  The 
individual produces maintenance in week j using own time denoted 
j
m t  and purchased inputs.  
Define the maintenance production function by  ), (
j
m
j t M  where purchased inputs are suppressed   9
for notational convenience.  The marginal product of own time is assumed to be positive but 
exhibits diminishing returns.  While maintenance is defined for each week, we also assume it is 
possible to shift maintenance activities between weeks.  This simple strategy is a key element in 
isolating the short-term, inter-temporal substitution that identifies how people tradeoff non-work 
time uses.  It translates the way most people keep track of time into a specific element in our 
model of choice behavior.  Total maintenance, M, is the sum of maintenance in the various 
weeks and is predetermined.  In the absence of other considerations, if the weekly maintenance 
functions were the same, each individual would spend equal amounts of time each week to 
minimize the total time costs of reaching the fixed level of total maintenance.
4  To the extent the 
functions differ by week, time would be allocated to equalize implied marginal costs of 
producing the required level of total maintenance.  Other uses of non-work time, however, imply 
the allocation is more complex.   
In our model, the alternative use of non-work time is leisure.  It could be, for example, 
going to a movie, socializing with friends and family, or walking or jogging at a local park.  For 
convenience we will refer to it as local recreation and denote it R
 j.  Recreation is produced using 
time spent in the activity and complementary purchased goods.  Again suppressing these other 




j t R .  The marginal product of time for recreation is positive, and the marginal productivity of 
time in recreation is increasing over the relevant range.  Larger blocks of recreation time are 
proportionally more useful in producing recreation. 
The individual gets satisfaction from allocating time to the leisure activity (recreation) 
and from purchased goods.  Purchased goods are denoted by x, where price has been normalized 
to one, and income for the period is y.  She allocates non-work time and income to maximize   10
utility subject to income and time constraints as well as to meet the maintenance requirement.  
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This model combines elements from several earlier treatments of time.  Time can make different 
contributions to utility through the various R’s.  There could also be contributions from both 
work and maintenance time allocations.  These are not explicitly entered in this definition of the 
choice problem because both are assumed to be pre-determined in period zero.  Inverting the J 
time constraints and substituting them into the maintenance function reduces the J+2-constraint 
problem reduces to a more familiar two-constraint case with maintenance serving a role 
comparable to the time constraint: 
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  Maximizing utility subject to (2) and the income constraint leads to solutions for the 
optimal time allocation and the indirect utility function V(y,T
1,…,T
J,M).  With λ and μ, the 
Lagrangian multipliers for money and maintenance, respectively, the Envelope Theorem implies 
Vy = λ and VM = μ.  More importantly we also have: 
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The marginal utility of time depends on the marginal product of time in maintenance.  As a 
result, the marginal opportunity cost of time can be defined in terms of this household production 
activity where time displacement is possible. 















ρ  (3)   11
Maintenance’s role as a recurring activity offers repeated time allocations, which provide 
opportunities for short term adjustments.  Properties of the maintenance activity imply the 
marginal value of time is larger when the marginal product of time in maintenance is larger.  
Since the marginal product is diminishing for maintenance, the marginal value of time is higher 
when little time is devoted to maintenance.  If little time is spent on maintenance, the marginal 
productivity of maintenance effort is high, and the opportunity cost of spending that time in 
leisure activities is also high.  As a consequence, the shadow value of different blocks of leisure 
time will depend on their size (i.e., the amount of time that must be “assembled”).  For a given 
individual these choices can result in differing marginal values of time for leisure activities of 
different lengths. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The model in the last section is based on choices within individual weeks, and the time 
spent in both recreation and maintenance can vary by week.  The marginal value of time for 
recreation in a given week will vary depending on the marginal product of maintenance, which in 
turn depends on the time spent on maintenance that week.  Implementing the model requires 
estimates of the household production function for maintenance.  Those estimates must be based 
on a survey of household maintenance behavior.  Our survey solicits time budgets for a “typical” 
week.  The response of a household represents a mean allocation of time.  Because of this the 
estimating equation is based on a simplified version of the model in section 3.  The estimates 
also use the responses to a stated preference question that provides an “external” opportunity to 
obtain maintenance services.  This opportunity is defined with a question that offers the 
possibility of purchasing (at a fixed hourly price ws) regularly scheduled hours of weekly   12
services that can be used for maintenance (i.e., lawn services, cleaning services, and a variety of 
other time saving market services).   
For the empirical model assume an individual’s utility for a representative week is given 
by U(x,H;M) where M is average time per week devoted to maintenance and is predetermined as 
before.
5  H represents leisure of all types.  Let the individual’s labor devoted to household 
maintenance production be L and purchased hours of maintenance service labor be L
S.
 6  We 
define f (L) to be the contribution to total maintenance from own labor, where f
 ′(L)>0 and 
f ″(L)<0, and we normalize the units for maintenance so that one hour of professional service 
provides one unit of maintenance.  Maintenance is therefore the total of own and purchased 
production, given by 
 . ) (
S L L f M + =  (4) 
Utility is maximized subject the budget constraint y = x + wsL
S, where x is the numeraire, ws is 
the price per hour of purchased maintenance, and time constraint T = H + L.  Substituting the 
time constraint and the maintenance function in (4) into the budget constraint yields 
 )] ( [ H T f M w x y s − − + = . (5) 
There are two types of solutions to this utility maximization problem.  The first involves 
individuals who purchase a positive amount of service at the offer price, resulting in an interior 
solution.  In this case, the value of time in a typical week with the option of purchased 
maintentance services, ρ
s, is  





H s − = = ρ
7 (6) 
In the second case we have individuals who choose not to purchase service at the offered price.  
As a result, it is not possible to collapse the maintenance and time constraints into the budget   13
constraint.  The value of time for these individuals is determined by a corner solution in the 
purchased service market: 
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where μ is the Lagrange multiplier for the maintenance constraint.  
  Estimating equations can be derived from (6) and (7).  Using censored regression and a 
specification for f we can estimate a transformation of the weak inequality given in equation (8), 






where L is the amount of own maintenance labor when the service is available at a price ws and 
ρ
 s is the mean value of time, which is determined in period zero.  We use the Feather and Shaw 
(2000) approach, discussed in section 2, to estimate that long run work/leisure tradeoff.  The 
responses to our actual and hypothetical behavior survey questions allow equation (8) to be 
estimated.  Our description of the hypothetical service is presented in the next section. 
Once the marginal product function has been estimated it is possible to calculate the 
value of the marginal product for each individual’s own maintenance labor in the absence of the 
hypothetical purchased personal service.  This is the marginal product evaluated at the observed 
allocation of personal labor to maintenance in the baseline, designated here as L
*.  With the 
baseline marginal product and the long term value of the shadow wage ρ
 s it is possible to 
calculate μ/λ, the marginal value of maintenance as: 






=  (9) 
Since labor decisions and overall maintenance levels are determined in period zero, the 
marginal utilities of income and of maintenance are constant over the short time period that is the   14
focus of this analysis.  Thus, the primary influence on the short run value of time from equation 
(3) will be due to time allocated to maintenance.  With estimates for the marginal product of 
maintenance as well as the long horizon shadow wage, our model allows estimation of the time 
cost of varying leisure time allocations. 
V.  DATA 
  Between May and September 2003 a mail survey was sent to a sample of homeowners in 
Wake County, North Carolina, USA.  The target population was homeowners who had 
purchased their homes between 1992 and 2001.  A random sample of 9,000 of these households, 
stratified by geographical location, was drawn from this population.  To verify that the survey 
would be sent to the owner (and resident) of the house, the addresses listed for tax purposes were 
cross checked with names and addresses of the individuals purchasing each house.  The sample 
was limited to cases where the addresses of the housing unit and the individual receiving the tax 
bill matched.  7,554 surveys reached valid addresses where it would be possible to receive a 
response.
8  The Dillman (1978) method for mailed surveys was followed with two mailings and a 
reminder postcard.  Returned surveys amounted to 31.7 percent of the mailings to correct 
addresses.  After screening for missing and implausible values, there were 1,719 useable 
responses for this analysis.
9  Thus, the sample for this analysis is less than the number of 
returned valid questionnaires due to item non-response.   
  Our response rate is at the lower end of what conventionally has been considered 
desirable based on experience in the nineties.  However, recent research on the topic suggests 
that low response rates alone do not signal non-response bias.  For example, Holbrook, Krosnick, 
and Pfent (2005) conclude their detailed evaluation of 100 random digit dialed telephone studies 
over a 10 year period noting that “…lower response rates seem not to substantially decrease   15
demographic representativeness within the range we examined” (p.38).
10  Our comparison with 
Census information suggests our survey is consistent with their findings.  To confirm this, we 
estimated a selection model.  The results are virtually identical to those from the estimation 
described here.  The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is not significant at the 5% level and 
the coefficients of each of the variables are not different between the two equations.  There is 
also no economically significant difference in the resulting marginal values of time.  Since non-
response bias appears to make no significant difference, we have not included the adjustment for 
it here.
11 
  Two aspects of the questionnaire are directly relevant to our model.  First, we solicited 
time usage for the respondent and spouse (if any) for fifteen activities including primary and 
secondary employment, commuting, and a wide variety of non-work activities.  The survey also 
includes questions about how much paid help the household hired for maintenance services, and 
whether they could freely choose how much time they allocated to each of the activities.  In 
addition, we asked about the flexibility they had in their work time.  Our survey also asked about 
labor supply choices using the same question developed by Feather and Shaw (2000).
12 
  Second, each household was asked about a personal assistance service (i.e., the stated 
choice question discussed earlier) that offers a substitute for each respondent’s time in household 
tasks.  After describing the services available and presenting a market price per hour, we asked if 
the respondent would purchase the service and, if so, how many hours in a typical week.  The 
framing of the question implies that it could be used for any of the activities undertaken by adults 
in the household.  We assume all hours allocated to household maintenance can be aggregated.  
The personal assistant question was followed by several regarding how respondents would use 
any time made available by purchasing the service.  The specific question about the potential   16
purchase is reproduced in Appendix A.
13  We also collected information on the earnings and 
non-labor income of the household, job characteristics, and a variety of other socio-economic 
variables.  The variables used and their descriptive statistics are given in the first three columns 
of Table 1. 
  Households’ reports of the time devoted to household activities (e.g. cleaning, cooking, 
etc.); yard work/gardening; activities related to your children; and shopping for routine 
needs/running errands were assumed to correspond to maintenance.  Following the assumption 
of unitary household
14 the times reported for the respondent and the spouse or partner (if present) 
were combined.  The amount of time for household maintenance is assumed to be the sum of 
times reported in these four categories.  Time allocated to maintenance when the hypothetical 
personal services are available is estimated by subtracting stated time purchases from the 
baseline measure of their time allocated to maintenance.
15 
 
VI.  EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
Specifications 
Our estimation of the short-run value of time function for households requires estimates 
of the long-run shadow wage, which is determined in period zero.  The Feather and Shaw (2000) 
framework assumes the market and shadow wages are equal for respondents with flexible work 
schedules. For unemployed, under-employed, and over-employed people the relationship 
between the shadow and market wages is an inequality.  The form of the estimating equation for 
each person in the sample depends on their responses to the question about adjusting their hours.  
Assuming normally distributed errors, a maximum likelihood estimator is used to estimate the 
parameters of the shadow wage and market wage functions.   17
Our specifications for these functions follow the Feather and Shaw application.  The 
shadow wage function includes a constant and variables for work hours, non-work income, 
spouse work hours, and qualitative variables indicating the presence of young children, gender, 
and an interaction term between gender and the presence of young children.  The market wage 
function includes a constant and variables for age, education, and indicators of race and gender.  
The parameter estimates are given in Appendix B.  The estimates are generally consistent with a 
priori expectations with most coefficients significant at conventional levels.  For the individuals 
in our sample, the mean predicted shadow wage is $26.64 and the median is $19.61 (in 2003 
dollars).   
  Estimation of the marginal product of maintenance requires specification of the personal 
maintenance production function.  We expect that this function would vary by individual and 
exhibit diminishing marginal product.  We focused on two specifications for this function, a log 
form and a quadratic form.  The results were quite comparable.  Since the quadratic form 
introduces more flexibility, those results are presented here.
16   
  The simple quadratic household production is given in equation (10). 
 
2 TP aL bL = +  (10) 
This form allows testing for diminishing MP.  A vector z including any observable 
individual/family characteristics that might influence productivity can be included in this 
equation.  Inverting the marginal product function and using the equality form of the first order 
condition given in equation (8) (recalling that ρ
s is the shadow wage and ws is price of personal 
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Algebraic transformations allow the structural parameters of the marginal product for time in 
maintenance to be recovered from the estimated coefficients.  That is: β1=1/(2a) and β0 + zβz 
=−b/(2a), or a=1/(2β1) and b=−2a(β0 + zβz).  Thus, the prediction would be β0>0 and β1<0.  
With this functional form, the marginal product may not be strictly positive even for parameters 
with the theoretically predicted signs, so this can be tested empirically as well. 
Results 
  The dependent variable is the number of hours devoted to household maintenance.  We 
use maximum likelihood assuming a censored normal distribution for the error.  The estimates 
are presented in columns 4 through 7 of Table 1.  Column four reports a parsimonious 
specification limited to include relative price and a constant.  Even in this specification, the 
marginal product is positive in the range of the data and diminishing as expected.  Our two step 
estimation strategy uses an estimate of the conditional expectation for ρ
S in the numerator of the 
ratio of shadow value to service price.  As a result, the estimated model can be expected to have 
a non-spherical error.  To take account of this issue, all of our tests use Huber’s (1967) robust 
covariance matrix for the estimated model parameters. 
We hypothesized that the characteristics of households also play an important role in 
explaining the differences in behavior with respect to maintenance.  Column five of Table 1 
provides the results for a more complete specification.  There are a number of factors that play a 
significant role in the maintenance decisions.  Households with higher labor income and thus 
probably higher opportunity costs of time do less own maintenance.  Households where a 
“significant other,” typically a spouse, is present do more own maintenance production.  Recall 
that maintenance is the sum of both members’ home production, so this does not represent any 
substitution within the household but rather a difference by household type.  The number of   19
family members in the house also increases maintenance.  There is partial support for the logic 
associated with our unitary household model in that the sex of the respondent was not a 
significant variable in this or other specifications and was not included.  Similarly, race was 
never significant and was omitted.  Age is not significant here but was included since it had 
explanatory power in other specifications. 
The difference in the number of hours worked by the respondent compared to his or her 
spouse is also hypothesized to influence reported own maintenance.  Our formulation of this 
effect codes this variable as one if the respondent works at least ten hours more per week than 
the spouse, zero if there is less than a ten hour difference between the work weeks for the couple, 
and negative one if the respondent works at least ten hours less than the spouse.  This variable 
was included to control for any differences in perceptions depending on the relative workforce 
participation of the respondent.
17  It is not significant in column 5 but is in the more complete 
specification in column 6.  This pattern is repeated with the work flexibility variable. 
The sixth column in the table reports the last and most complete specification of the 
model.  The first of the additional variables uses the number of non-work hours calculated in two 
ways.  The first uses the number of hours in a week and subtracts the number of hours that 
respondents reported they devoted to all employment plus the time spent commuting plus an 
allowance for time spent sleeping.  We expect the respondent to be quite accurate in reporting 
work and commute time.  As a result, this measure probably represents a fairly accurate measure 
of non-work time.  The second strategy simply uses the total of all the time reported for non-
work activities.
18  The difference in the two measures captures the accuracy and completeness of 
the respondent’s accounting for non-work time.
19  As expected, if the accounting for non-work 
activities in general was higher, the reported time spent on maintenance was also higher.     20
The other two variables included in this full specification are based on the responses to 
the question about what survey respondents would do with the new time made available by 
employing the hypothetical personal services.  The variables are dichotomous variables for those 
who said they would work longer hours and for those that said they would devote the time to 
housework.  The omitted category was for those who would use the time for leisure activities.  
The individuals who would take more leisure tended to report more time spent on maintenance.  
Finally, the time flexibility measure is positive and significant, whereas in the previous 
specification it was not significant.  Households where there was flexibility in shifting the work 
schedule devote more time to household maintenance.  Diminishing marginal product in 
household maintenance is more of an issue if work hours cannot be shifted, so this is a plausible 
result. 
This last specification of the quadratic model is our preferred model and is used in 
calculating the marginal value of different blocks of time.  In estimating the household’s 
maintenance services production function, we used the exogenous price of purchased services 
that was given in the survey.  However, the individual’s value of time is based on her actual 
choices.  To calculate the value using equation (6), we use the marginal product of own labor, 
calculated at the actual level of household services.  For the quadratic specification, the estimates 
of the various values of time depend on the socio-economic characteristics of the individual as 
well as the shadow wages.  Table 2 provides the quantiles of the distribution of the predicted 
marginal value of time for blocks of leisure time that displaced 2, 4, 6, and 8 maintenance hours, 
as well as the long-run shadow value of time of these individuals.   
The marginal value of time increases as the blocks of recreation time become longer, as 
hypothesized.  Non-work choices convey information about the value of time.  To use these   21
choices effectively, we must recognize the constraints on how time must be “assembled” to 
undertake activities and evaluate how people make choices that allow them to put time blocks 
together. 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
People’s choices about their time allocations are made sequentially with some choices 
serving as commitments that constrain others that come later (at least until the consequences are 
important enough to warrant incurring the costs of revision).  In this paper we have shown that it 
is possible to use recognition of these commitments to estimate a short-run shadow value of time.  
Many leisure time activities take place in relatively small blocks of time, and the value of time 
may differ depending on the size of the block.  Our strategy for valuing time for non-working 
activities has used information from revealed and stated preferences and decisions made over 
different time horizons.  The results indicate that the marginal value of time can be increasing as 
the size of the block time increases.   
This framework seems likely to have applicability for a wide range of extra-market 
valuation problems.  In particular there has been recent discussion of methods needed for 
augmenting the national income and product accounts to reflect non-market activities (see 
Nordhaus, 2006; and Frazis and Stewart, 2004) as well as attention to non-work time allocation 
in general.  As we have shown, the frequency and timing of the non-market activities matter and 
short-run time constraints and the production technology imply a shadow value of time (and 
hence opportunity cost of the non-market output) that need not be equal to the wage rate nor 
constant.  Our research shows how a strategic stated preference question might be used to define 
the non-market commodity, partially understand its production technology, and assess its shadow 
value.  As well, we demonstrate the importance of including questions in time use surveys that   22
acquire information about the decisions on how much home production to undertake as a means 
of gauging short-run time constraints and values.   
Finally, our method highlights a new role for stated choice questions.  Most applications 
have focused on new choices, offering individuals the opportunity to decide about an amenity 
that has previously been outside their choice set.  In addition, many previous efforts at joint 
estimation were designed to use revealed preference data to calibrate stated preference responses.  
Our model relies on an integrated strategy in which the stated preference model offers a different 
type of choice margin that may serve to relax time constraints.  This new information can be 
combined with data on actual time allocation decisions to derive new insights on the tradeoffs 
people implicitly make through a sequential set of market and non-market choices.   23
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Parameter Estimates   
Variable Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Quadratic Model 
Estimated coefficient  
(Robust z-statistic) 






Shadow wage/ personal 















Number of family 








Work distribution in 








Completeness of response  -69.49  52.01      0.37 
(14.68) 
Choose more paid work  0.04  -      -31.68 
(-6.18) 
Choose more housework  0.20  -      -43.49 
(-11.49) 
Sigma     55.24  44.97  33.97 
Log Likelihood     -2104.82 -1836.23  -1718.66 
# of obs.     1907  1719  1719 
# uncensored     310  282 282   26
 
Table 2: Quantiles of Marginal Value of Time for Blocks of Different Lengths 
(Based on the Quadratic Model with all socio-economic variables) 
 
Quantile Baseline  2-hour  block  4-hour block  6-hour block  8-hour block 
10% 1.65 1.74 1.80 1.88 1.97 
25% 5.70 5.94 6.10 6.17 6.39 
50%  19.61 20.14 20.80 21.48 22.19 
75%  31.89 33.10 34.32 35.61 37.00 
90%  57.64 61.19 64.20 66.58 69.05 
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Appendix A: Excerpt from survey 
10. Personal Assistance Services 
 
It is becoming more common to see firms that provide personal assistant services starting up.  These types of 
businesses organize and perform many household tasks such as house cleaning, lawn care, food shopping, and a 
wide array of other tasks.  Clients typically contract for a specific number of hours per week and specify the 
activities employees of the firm are to do.  If transportation is needed for the tasks, it is provided by the firm and 
included in the number of hours that are purchased.  Guarantees are made that the service is safe and reliable.  It 
is not necessary for clients to be present when the tasks are performed.  In spite of the growth in this industry, 
little is understood about how much of these services would be used.  
 
If this personal assistance service was $5.50* per hour used, would you purchase any time? 
______ yes    ______ no 
 
If you answered yes, how much personal service time would you purchase in a typical week?  Please check the 
relevant box or write in the value. (If no, skip to Part C, “Leisure Outings”). 
 
 
Hours Purchased In a 
Typical Week  Total Weekly Cost  Please Check the 
Relevant Box 
1  $5.50 x 1 = $5.50  □ 
2  $5.50 x 2 = $11  □ 
3  $5.50 x 3 = $16.50  □ 
4  $5.50 x 4 = $22  □ 
5  $5.50 x 5 = $27.50  □ 
If your purchase would be more than five hours, 
please indicate how many:  ____ hours per week 
   
      The hours I would purchase would replace paid services I currently use for some household tasks. 
     □ yes 
     □ no 
On average, how would you most likely use the time you saved by purchasing this service? (check most    likely 
use) 
□ Use the time to work additional hours  
□ Use the time for activities I enjoy 
□ Use the time for other household tasks 
*Prices of $5.50, $8, $10, $20,$30, and $50 were used on different versions of the survey.   28
Appendix B: Shadow Wage Estimation 
 
 
Feather and Shaw Model Parameter Estimates
a 
Shadow wage variables Estimate t-statistic 
Constant 0.4209  1.55 
Work hours  0.0661  7.293 
Non-work income  0.0455  4.71 
Spouse hours  -0.0097  -4.472 
Kids<6 0.7184  6.668 
Kids<6×male -0.7553  -5.63 
Male -0.0799  -0.492 
Market wage variables    
Constant 4.1693  12.964 
Male 0.6765  4.532 
Black/Hispanic -0.5793  -7.049 
Age 0.318  2.178 
Education 0.0749  2.87 
Error variance    
Std. dev. Shadow wage  2.5543  39.176 
Std. dev. Market wage  3.2322  39.085 
Correlation
b  1.7867 4.857 
aDependent variable is the natural log of the wage rate 
bcorrelation is ρ=exp(δ)/1+exp(δ) where δ is estimated 
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manuscript. 
 
1 Recently some research has focused on individuals whose occupations allow labor supply 
adjustments over short intervals.  The findings from these studies have created some controversy 
(Camerer, et al., 1997; Farber, 2005) about whether labor/leisure choices can be interpreted as 
responding to the tradeoffs underlying the conventional labor supply model.   
 
2 DeSerpa’s model builds on the insights of Becker (1965) and Johnson (1965). 
 
3 In a very different context, the model in Hamermesh (2005) discusses the costs of shifting 
activities between periods to gain variety.  His model suggests that variety contributes to utility, 
but routine behavior reduces the costs of the activity. 
 
4  This notion is consistent with Hamermesh’s (2005) treatment of the role of household 
production for the timing of activities: 
 
“Routine (selecting the same time for the same activity and repeating it at the 
same time over several periods) is productive, in that it enables the 
producer/consumer to mechanize decisions about when and how to engage in 
each activity, thus allowing her to produce/consume more of each commodity” 
(p.82, parenthetical description inserted). 
 
5 Since total maintenance over the time periods is predetermined as is the number of time 
periods, the average per period is predetermined. 
 
6 In this empirical model we use L to denote own maintenance labor to distinguish the amount of 
planned labor in the typical week from the actual amount of labor  ,
j
m t  decided at the short time 
horizon. 
 
7 An alternative way to interpret this equation would be to divide both sides by the marginal 
product of own labor.  The individual should equate the marginal cost of own production to the 
price for purchased maintenance services. 
 
8 This figure reflects adjustment for changes that were not captured with the cross check of tax 
records.  These include household re-location, death, age limiting a designated respondent’s 
ability to answer, and mail loss. 
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9 We eliminated observations with a predicted shadow wage greater than $500, those with 
reported own maintenance hours greater than 150 hours/week, and those who reported they 
would purchase more hypothetical hours of services than they reported actually doing 
themselves. 
 
10 Response rates in the studies these authors considered ranged from 4 percent to 70 percent.  A 
second study by Keeter et al. (2000) compared a “standard” and “rigorous” survey using 
identical questionnaires.  The standard realized a response rate of 36 percent and the rigorous 
60.6.  The authors considered 96 comparisons, no difference exceeded 9 percentage points and 
the average difference was 2 points. 
 
11 Details of the estimation controlling for non-response are available in an appendix available 
from the authors. 
 
12 In the questions preceding the time allocation questions, to orient respondents to time related 
choices, the survey also asked about a variety of time-saving market products and services they 
may have used recently. 
 
13 The complete sections of the survey on time use and time-saving activities are available from 
the authors on request. 
 
14 This survey had one interview.  It was not possible to exploit the panel structure Couprie 
(2007) used to identify a collective model for the household.  We are forced to maintain the 
assumption of a unitary household.  There is nothing in the conceptual structure that would 
preclude this extension. 
 
15 Some of the respondents indicated that they were using hired assistance already for household 
tasks.  For those that indicated that the hypothetical services we offered would be substituted for 
the services they already used, we added their own household time and the hired time before 
subtracting their purchase of the offered services.  For those who said the offered services would 
not be substituted for the hired services they were currently using, we used the current own time 
and subtracted their purchase of the offered services. 
 
16 The results for the log form are available from the authors. 
 
17 Recall that the dependent variable is the combined hours of maintenance in the household and 
not hours done by the respondent. 
 
18 We may have missed potential categories, but our list was fairly exhaustive and included all 
activities mentioned in the focus groups. 
 
19 See Kahneman et al. (2004) for related discussion of this issue. 
 